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14 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: First 1969 Meeting of China Intelligence Activities
Coordination Group

DCI Conference Room
1000 hours, Tuesday, 11 March 1969

PRESENT:

[REDACTED]

DCI China Coordinator,
Chairman

Mr. John Holdridge

[REDACTED]

Department of State
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. John Manning

Mr. Edward O'Malley

Mr. Charles Reichardt

Atomic Energy Commission
Central Intelligence Agency

[REDACTED]

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A. Introductory Discussion.

1. [REDACTED] welcomed the participants and explained the derivation and purposes of the Group. He stated the general purpose to be that of seeking -- largely through refinement of existing efforts -- to improve the quality and utility of present US intelligence concerning Communist China.

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1 2. This means, said [REDACTED] that the Group:

a. Would seek through the refining, questioning, and tailoring of existing efforts to achieve improved results, both within our responsive Agencies, and collectively. An

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b. Would double check existing intelligence emphases, supporting those which are the most productive, and questioning those which are unproductive or which produce intelligence of little or no qualitative consequence.

c. Would recommend new collection efforts.

d. Would foster the closest possible informal relationships between collector and consumer.

e. Would foster the optimum relevance of intelligence product to US policy and security needs.

f. Would be discriminating in its work, concentrating the Group's efforts on certain key intelligence needs and opportunities.

g. In seeking refinement of effort, would appreciate that existing China awareness, priorities, and effort within the US intelligence community are already fairly good, and that by and large everyone is presently doing his best to produce on China.

h. Would avoid excessive meetings and paper work.

i. Would not constitute another bureaucratic layer, or a duplication of or infringement upon the existing China

equities and responsibilities of other entities already in the China field: [REDACTED]

j. Would monitor all of the intelligence community's various China efforts.

k. Would seek to assure that no intelligence needs inadvertently fall between stools.


l. Would foster a rational, over-all intelligence approach to the China question, concentrating on the broad objectives and the relevance of US intelligence efforts, and avoiding a project-by-project US approach.

3. There was general agreement with [REDACTED] view that much of the Group's efforts could be accomplished informally, within our existing agencies. In answer to [REDACTED] question as to how the Group should proceed in cases of more formal action involving more than one agency, [REDACTED] explained the CIAC Group's broad Charter and indicated that depending upon the particular question at hand, we would deal with appropriate USIB committees, or with the USIB itself and the DCI, or with the new National Intelligence Resources Board which has been formed precisely to deal with possible major modifications in present inter-agency intelligence efforts.

B. Intelligence objectives and capabilities with respect to Communist China.

4. [REDACTED] stated that in line with the above-stated USIB interests in an over-all, objectives-oriented approach to given intelligence problems, he felt it useful for the Group to examine the question of the threat which Communist China represents and the services which intelligence can perform thereto. To this end [REDACTED] distributed drafts of a paper, "Intelligence and the China Problem" which he had

25X1 prepared informally. He asked that the representatives consider this draft a series of propositions for discussion, that they try out the text's judgments on themselves and their own agency colleagues, and that discussion of this text be an important subject matter of the CIAC Group's next meeting. [] urged frank responses, stating his belief that, in particular, our examination of intelligence strengths and weaknesses would help us collectively to define our own areas of agreement/difference and to identify those areas where the most work needs doing to attempt to improve US intelligence performance.



D. The Sino-Soviet border question.

8. Representatives of NPIC and the Office of Strategic Research, CIA, presented an all-source briefing to the Group on the Sino-Soviet

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

border situation, with respect both to the 2 March incident along the Ussuri and to the broader question of the border problem in general. Following this briefing the Group discussed US all-source intelligence capabilities in the event a future acute crisis should arise concerning the Sino-Soviet borders. There was general agreement in the Group that the 2 March incident probably did not reflect a premeditated major crisis move on the part of either Peking or Moscow, but rather another incident, though more serious in degree, which both sides have subsequently chosen to dramatize and escalate.

25X1 9. [REDACTED] There was general agreement with a suggestion raised by [REDACTED] that the CIA-DIA analysis model concerning the Byelo-Russian Military District might come to have application, as well, concerning Soviet and Chinese ground forces developments attending a future border crisis.

E. The services which clandestine reporting performs with respect to China.


25X1 10. [REDACTED] asked the members of the Group if they would present informal or oral reports to him, by 11 April 1969, of their Agency's assessment of clandestine reporting on China, CIA and otherwise. He asked that such reports indicate those areas where clandestine reporting was most useful and least useful, and not shirk from suggesting items where clandestine reporting might conceivably be improved.

TOP SECRET 

- G. The next meeting will be on call. It will plan to include representation from USA, USN, and USAF.



DCI China Coordinator

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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